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of combat
by
Charles C. Moskos, Jr.
Department of Sociology 
Northwestern University 
Evanston, Illinois, USA
That men too often find themselves fighting wars is a 
depressing commentary on both history and contem­
porary life. That many of these same men endure sit­
uations where they can be killed and kill others is a 
perplexing fact of human behavior. It is not surpris­
ing, then, that interpretations of the motivations of 
men in combat are many. From among diverse ac­
counts, however, we can distinguish some recurring 
themes that seek to explain the bases of combat per­
formance.
The viewpoint with perhaps the earliest antecedents 
finds combat motivation resting on the presumed na­
tional character of the general populace. The varying 
effectiveness of different national armies has often 
been popularly ascribed to the putative martial spirit 
of their respective citizenries. The use of national 
character explanations of military effectiveness, how­
ever, is not unique to popular folklore. In our own 
country’s recent history, certain prominent spokes­
men invoked such broad cultural determinants to 
explain the alleged poor performance of American 
prisoners of war in the Korean War as a result of a 
«softening)) of the American character.1
A contrasting viewpoint sees combat performanc- 
as essentially resulting from the operation of the for­
mal military organization. Combat motivation results 
from effective military training and discipline, and 
unit esprit de corps.- Although such a viewpoint is typ­
ically associated with traditionalist military thought, 
the importance of military socialization is similarly 
emphasized—albeit from different premises—by com­
mentators concerned with the assumed deleterious 
consequences of military life on personality develop­
ment.3 Thus, we frequently find both supporters and 
opponents of the goals of the military organization 
giving great weight to the total or all-inclusive featu­
res of military life.4
Another interpretation of combat behavior holds
1. See especially Eugene Kinkead, In Every War But One 
(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1959); and the re­
buttal by Albert D. Biderman, March to Calumny (New York: 
The Macmillan Company, 1963).
2. See, for example, Field Manuel 22-100, Military Leader­
ship (Washington, D.C. : Government Printing Office, 1965); 
and Russell B. Reynolds, The Officer's Guide (Harrisburg, 
Pa. : Stackpole Press, 1966), passim.
3. See, for example, Arthur J. Vidich and Maurice R. Stein, 
«The Dissolved Identity in Military Life», in Maurice R. Stein 
el at. (eds.), Identity and Anxiety (New York: Free Press, 
1960) 493-506; and Carl Cohen, «The Military in a Democracy», 
Centennial Review, 7 (Winter, 1963), 75-94.
4. Thus two bestsellers on the American Special Forces in 
Vietnam are in central agreement on the socialization processes 
occurring among these troops, but have opposite conclusions 
as to the moral outcome. Cf. the romanticized view of Special 
Forces in Robin Moore, The Green Berets (New York, Avon 
Publications, Inc., 1965), with the negative picture given in 
Donald Duncan, The New Legions (New York: Random House 
Inc., 1967).
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that the effective soldier is motivated either by a sense 
of national patriotism, or by a belief that he is fight­
ing for a just cause. Such a viewpoint holds that com­
bat performance depends on the soldier’s commit­
ment to abstract values or the symbols of the larger 
society. The effective soldier, in other words, is an 
ideologically inspired soldier. Combat performance 
directly varies with the soldier’s conscious allegiance 
to the stated purposes of the war. It is usually as­
sumed in this regard that such allegiance preexists the 
soldier’s entry into the formal military organization. 
The ideological explanation in its various forms has 
become the hallmark of virtually all official rhetoric 
as well as much of the conventional wisdom.
A quite different explanation of combat motivation, 
largely arising from the social science studies of 
World War II, deemphasizes ideological considera­
tions (and, to a lesser extent, formal organizational 
factors as well). It focuses attention instead on the role 
of face-to-face or «primary» groups, and explains 
the motivation of the individual combat soldier as a 
function of his solidarity and social intimacy with fel­
low soldiers at small group levels.1 Significantly, the 
rediscovery of the importance of primary groups by 
social scientists paralleled corresponding accounts 
given by journalists, novelists, and other combat ob­
servers.2 In its more extreme formulation, combat pri-
1. Samuel A. Stouffer et al., The American Soldier (Prince­
ton: Princeton University Press, 1949), IT, 105-191: Edward A. 
Shils and Morris Janowitz, «Cohesion and Disinteeration in the 
Wehrmacht in World War II», Public Opinion Quarterly, 12 
(Summer, 1948), 280-315 ; GeorgeC. Homans, «The Small War­
ship», American Sociological Review, 11 (June, 1946), 294-300; 
Paul F. Lazarsfeld, «The American Soldier—An Expository 
Review», Public Opinion Quarterly, 13 (Fall, 1949), 377-404; 
Edward A. Shils, «Primary Groups in the American Army», in 
Robert K. Merton and Paul F. Lazarsfeld (eds.), Continuities 
in Social Research: S tudies in the Scope and Method of ((The 
American Soldier» (New York: Free Press, 1950), 16-39; Da­
vid G. Mandelbaum, Soldiers Groups and Negro Soldiers 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 
1952), 5-87; Norman À. Hilmar, «The Dynamics of Military 
Group Behavior», in Charles H. Coates and Ronald J. Pellegrin 
(eds.), Military Sociology (University Park, Md.: Social Science 
Press, 19651, 31 1-335; and Roy R. Grinker and John P. Spiegel, 
Men Under Stress (New York: Me Graw-Hill, Inc., 1963), 
443-460.
It should be noted, however, that caveats were introduced in 
several of the World War II descriptions of primary-group deter­
minants in combat motivation. Thus, Shils and Janowitz, op. 
cit., directed some attention toward the role of «secondary sym­
bols» (e.g., respect for the Führer) among German soldiers. 
Also, Shils’s discussion of The American Soldier, while general­
ly stressing tha importance of primary-group processes, never­
theless cautioned: «Yet it would be a mistake to say that the 
tacit patriotism of the soldiers played no significant part in 
disposing the men to acceptance, obedience and initiative. The 
widespread character of their acceptance of the legitimacy of 
the war although in itself not a strong combat motivation must 
still be viewed as flowing both directly and indirectly into com­
bat motivation». Shils, op. cit. 24.
2. Among the better known of such accounts are: —►
mary relationships were viewed as so intense that they 
overrode not only preexisting civilian values and for­
mal military goals, but even the individual's own sense 
of self-concern.
Although I will refer here to the national character 
and formal military organization explanations, my 
major attention will be directed to the considerations 
raised in the ideological and primary-group interpre­
tations of combat performance. Put most simply, I 
argue that combat motivation arises out of the linka­
ges between individual self-concern, primary-group 
processes, and the shared beliefs of soldiers. The 
ideological and primary-group explanations are not 
contradictory. Rather, an understanding of the com­
bat soldier’s motivation requires a simultaneous ap­
preciation of the role of small groups and under­
lying value commitments as they are shaped by the 
immediate combat situation.
collection of data
The information for the ensuing discussion is based 
on my observations of American soldiers in combat 
made during two separate stays in South Vietnam. 
During the first field trip in 1965, I spent two weeks 
with a weapons squad in a rifle platoon of an airborne 
(paratrooper) unit. The second field trip in 1967 in­
cluded a six-day stay with an infantry rifle squad, and 
shorter periods with several other combat squads. 
Although I identified myself as a university pro­
fessor and sociologist,! had little difficulty gaining ac­
cess to the troops because of my official status as an 
accredited correspondent. I entered combat units by 
simply requesting permission from the local head­
quarters to move into a squad. Once within a squad, 
I experienced the same living conditions as the squad 
members. The novelty of my presence soon dissipated 
as I became a regular participant in the day-to-day ac­
tivities of the squad.
The soldiers with whom I was staying were perform­
ing combat missions of a patroling nature, the most 
typical type of combat operation in Vietnam, at least 
through 1968. Patrols are normally small-unit opera­
tions involving squads (9-12 men) or platoons (30-40 
men). Such small units made up patrols whose usual 
mission was to locate enemy forces that could then be 
subjected to group, artillery, or air attack. Patrol’s 
normally last one or several days and are manned by 
lower-ranking enlisted men, noncommissioned offi-
—► S.L.A. Marshall, Men Against Fire (New York: William 
Morrow and Company, Inc.,1947); J. Glenn Gray, TheWarriors 
(New York: Harcourt, Brace, & World, Inc., 1959); Bill Maul­
din, Up Front (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 
1945); Norman Mailer, The Naked and the Dead (New York: 
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1948); and James Jones, The 
Thin Red Line (New York : Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1962).
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cers leading squads, and lieutenants heading platoons.
In the vast majority of instances these patrols turn 
out to be a «walk in the sun», meeting no or only spo­
radic enemy resistance. Even when enemy contact is 
not made, however, patrols suffer casualties from land 
mines and boody traps. But it is primarily on those 
occasions when enemy forces are encountered that 
casualty rates are extremely high. Indeed, casualty sur­
veys through mid-1967 report that 65 per cent of all 
American losses in Vietnam occurred on patrol-type 
operations.1 Upon return to the permanent base camp, 
members of the patrol are able to enjoy a modicum of 
physical comfort. They live in large tents, eat hot 
food, get their mail more or less regularly, see mov­
ies, and can purchase beer, cigarettes, and toilet ar­
ticles at field Post Exchanges. The bulk of the time in 
the base camp is spent on guard duty and maintaining 
equipment.
In both the 1965 and 1967 field trips, I collected 
data through informal observations and personal in­
terviewing of combat soldiers. During the second 
field trip, however, I made an additional effort to ob­
tain information in a somewhat more systematic man­
ner as well. Toward this end, I conducted^ 34 stand­
ardized interviews dealing with some of the issues 
presented in this chapter. I interviewed not only the 
men of the particular squads I was living with, but 
also, when the opportunity arose, combat soldiers of 
other squads in the same company. Some of the in­
formation contained in these 34 interviews is amena­
ble to tabular ordering and is so presented. Yet even 
when given in tabular form the data are not to be 
conceived as self-contained, but rather as supportive 
of more broadly based observations.
I know that it is hazardous, if not presumptuous, to 
generalize about the contemporary American combat 
soldier from observations of such limited scope. But 
I think it worthwhile. In the first place, I regard the 
men interviewed and observed as typical and repre­
sentative of American combat soldiers. The attitudes 
expressed by the formally interviewed soldiers con­
stantly reappeared in shorter conversations T had 
with numerous other combat soldiers in both 1965 and 
1967. Again and again, I was struck by the common 
reactions of soldiers to the combat experience and 
their participation in the war. Moreover, since the da­
ta is not of the survey-sample kind, but relies instead 
on intimate interviewing and participant observations, 
the materials gathered allow certain kinds of qualita­
tive inferences. What was being tapped were the deep­
ly held values and world views of these soldiers. Bv 
being in the combat situation, 1 could go beyond ritual­
istic answers to pat questions. In any event, I assert 
with'some confidence that the findings reflect a set of
1. The New York Times, June 1, 1967, 15.
beliefs widely shared by American combat soldiers 
throughout Vietnam during the period of the field 
work.
Before looking at the attitudes and behavior of A- 
merican combat soldiers in Vietnam, some prefatory 
comment is in order on the proportional numbers of 
military personnel in combat situations and on the so­
cial composition of combat groups. How many men 
are actually combat soldiers? Despite a commonly 
held view that danger to American soldiers was wide­
spread throughout Vietnam and pervasive for all eche­
lons, the fact remains that in any large-scale military 
organization—even in the actual theater of war—only 
a fraction of men under arms personally experience 
combat. As in other modern American wars, nearly 
all casualties in Vietnam are suffered by that small 
group of men in the front of first echelon of the mili­
tary organization: the soldiers taking part in patrols, 
major battles, and air operations. Although rear-eche­
lon units may be subjected to occasional commando- 
type raids by the enemy as well as sporadic rocket 
bombardment, observes in Vietnam agree that only a 
small proportion of casualties occur in other than 
front-echelon units.
Interestingly, there is a strong element of formal or­
ganizational support for defining the conflict in Viet­
nam as a «no front war». Combat pay is given to all 
military personnel in Vietnam regardless of duties; 
income tax benefits and postal franking privileges are 
given to all soldiers stationed «in-country»; and, most 
important, the one-vear rotation cycle apnlies equally 
to the supply clerk in Saigon and to the rifleman who 
has spent all his time in the field. Moreover, the no­
tion that danger is widespread throughout Vietnam is 
one, as would be expected, that is informally fostered 
by manv rear-area personnel. Yet. as has been true in 
other, if not all, wars, the front-echelon soldier makes 
a sharp distinction between his position and that of 
rear-area servicemen.
But coming up with definite figures on the propor­
tion of men actually in combat is extremely difficult. 
The unavailability of casualty statistics by unit de­
signation, conflicting definitions of what constitutes 
combat, and changing numbers of men, all preclude a 
final answer to how many men can be considered com­
bat soldiers. Press reports in mid-1967 placed the pro­
portion of American soldiers in the first echelon— 
that is, directly engaging with the enemy—at 14 per 
cent.2 This estimate closely corresponds with the views 
of other informed observers. To this one can add 
about the same proportion of the total forces who are 
in close combat-support units. Tn other words, approx­
imately 70 per cent of the men in Vietnam cannot be 
considered combat soldiers except by the loosest of
2. Ibid,., July 13, 1967, 16.
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definitions. And the proportion of military noncom­
batants would be even higher if one added to the men 
physically stationed in South Vietnam those American 
military personnel assigned to bases in the wider war 
theater and naval units offshore. If the combat num­
bers in the Vietnam War were proportioned over the 
entire 3,400,000 men in the American armed forces 
for this period only about 2 per cent of the total ac­
tive-duty personnel were directly experiencing combat.
At this point it is exceedingly important to reiterate 
a crucial set of findings documented earlier. Name­
ly, once within the military organization, persons com­
ing from the lower socioeducational levels and racial 
minority groups of our society are overproportion- 
ately assigned to combat units. This general state of af­
fairs is directly reflected in the social composition of 
the combat squads I observed. The 34 soldiers inter­
viewed had the following civilian backgrounds prior 
to entering the service: 10 were high school dropouts, 
only 2 of whom were ever regularly employed; 21 were 
high school graduates, 6 directly entering the service 
after finishing school; and 3 were college dropouts. 
None were college graduates. Eighteen of the 34 com­
bat soldiers had full-time employment before entering 
the service, 12 in blue-collar jobs and 6 in wh’te-collar 
employment. In terms of conventional categories, 
about two-thirds of the soldiers were from working- 
class backgrounds with the remainder being from the 
lower middle class.
As for other social background characteristics: 8 
were black; 1 was a Navajo; another was from Guam; 
the other 20 men were white, including 3 Mexican-A- 
mericans and 1 Puerto Rican. Only 7 of the squad 
members were married (three after entering the serv­
ice). All the men, except the 2 sergeants, were in their 
late teens and early twenties, the average age beine 20. 
Again excepting the sergeants, all were on their initial 
enlistments. Twenty of the men were draftees and 14 
were regular Army volunteers. Importantly, except 
for occasional sardonic comments directed toward the 
regulars by the draftees, the behavior and attitudes of 
the soldiers toward the war were very similar regard­
less of how they entered the service.
the combat situation
To convey the immediacy of the combat situation is 
hard enough for the novelist, not to say the sociolo­
gist. But to understand the way the soldier’s attitudes 
and behavior are shaped, one must try to comprehend 
the extreme phvsical conditions under which he must 
manage. It is only in the context of the immediate com­
bat situation that one can appreciate the nature of the 
primary-group processes developed in combat squads. 
For within the network of interpersonal relationships 
with fellow squad members, the combat soldier is also
fighting a very private war, a war he hopes to leave 
alive and unscathed.
Absolute deprivation. The concept of relative depri­
vation, as an interpretive variable, suggests that an 
individual’s evaluation of his situation can be under­
stood by knowing the reference group of comparison. 
We should not, however, lose sight of those extreme 
conditions where deprivation is absolute as well as re­
lative. In the combat situation of absolute deprivation, 
the individual’s social horizon is narrowly determined 
by his immediate life chances, in the most literal sense. 
The combat soldier, as an absolutely deprived person, 
responds to direct situational exigencies. He acts 
pragmatically to maximize short-run advantages in 
whatever form they exist. Though combat soldiers do 
not display what C. Wright Mills termed the «socio­
logical imagination» (i.e., relating personal situations 
to broader societal conditions), this is not simply a 
default in political sophistication.1 Rather, for the sol­
dier concerned with his own day-to day survival, the 
decisions of state that brought him into combat are 
simply irrelevant. It is in this sense that the pros and 
cons of the basic issues of national policy become 
meaningless to the combat soldier.
In the combat situation, the soldier not only faces 
the imminent danger of loss of life and, more fright­
ening for most, limb, but also witnesses combat 
wounds and deaths suffered by «buddies». Moreover, 
there are the routine physical stresses of combat ex­
istence: the weight of the pack, tasteless food, diarrhea, 
lack of water, leeches, mosquitos, rain, torrid heat, 
mud, and loss of sleep. In an actual firefight with the 
enemy, the scene is generally one of utmost chaos and 
confusion. Deadening fear intermingles with acts of 
bravery and, strangely enough, even moments of ex­
hilaration and comedy. If enemy prisoners are taken, 
they may be subjected to atrocities in the rage of bat­
tle or its immediate aftermath. The soldier’s distaste 
of endangering civilians is overcome by his fear that 
Vietnamese, of any age or sex, can be responsible for 
his own death. Where the opportunity arises, looting 
often occurs. War souvenirs are frequently collected 
either to be kept personally or later sold to rear-eche­
lon servicemen.
Once the combat engagement is over, the soldier 
still has little idea in a strategic sense of what has been
l.C. Wright Mills, The Sociological Imagination (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1959). The emphasis in my discussion 
on the constraints of situational determinants on attitude forma­
tion is directly indebted to AllisonDavis’s description of «prac­
tical cultural systems» in his «The Motivation of the Underpriv­
ileged Worker», in William F. Whyte (ed.), Indus try and So­
ciety (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1946), 84-106. For a re­
buttal of the Davis position see, Lewis A. Coser, «Unantici­
pated Conservative Consequences of Liberal Theorizing», So­
cial Problems 16 (Winter, 1969), 263-272.
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accomplished. His view of the war is limited to his own 
personal observations and subsequent talks with 
others in the same platoon or company. The often- 
noted reluctance of combat soldiers to discuss their 
experiences when back home is not present in the field. 
They make a conversational mainstay of recounting 
battles and skirmishes with the enemy. They engage in 
such discussions not so much for their intrinsic inte­
rest but, more importantly, to specify tactical proce­
dures that may save lives in future encounters with the 
enemy.
Rotation. For the individual soldier, the paramount 
factor affecting combat motivation is the operation 
of the rotation system. Under assignment policies 
during the period of the field study, military personnel 
served a twelve-month tour of duty in Vietnam. Barr­
ing his being killed or severely wounded, then, every 
soldier knows his exact departure date from Vietnam. 
The combat soldier’s whole being centers on reaching 
his personal DEROS (from Date Expected Return 
Overseas). It would be hard to overstate the soldier’s 
constant concern with how much more time—down 
to the day—he has remaining in Vietnam.
The Vietnam rotation policy differs importantly 
from previous wartime assignment policies. In the 
First and Second World Wars, men served for the du­
ration until final military victory was achieved. In the 
war in Korea, a rotation policy was introduced, but 
Army men assigned to rear echelons served a longer 
period than those in combat units. In Vietnam, on the 
other hand, no distinction is made for rotation pur­
poses between front-and rear-echelon units. In other 
words, a universalist assignment policy further com­
pounds imbalances in sharing the risks of combat.
Within the combat unit itself, the rotation system 
has many consequences for social cohesion and indi­
vidual motivation. The rapid turnover of personnel 
hinders the development of primary-group ties as well 
as rotating out of the unit men who have attained com­
bat experience. It also, however, mitigates those 
strains (noted in World War II) when new replace­
ments are confronted by seasoned combat veterans.1 
Also, because of the tactical nature of patrols and the 
somewhat random likelihood of encountering the ene­
my, a new arrival may soon experience more actual 
combat than many of the men in the same company 
who are nearing the end of their tour in Vietnam. In 
any event, whatever its effects on the long-term com­
bat effectiveness of the American forces as a whole, 
the rotation system largely accounts for the usually 
high morale of the individual combat soldier.
During his one-year tour in Vietnam, the combat 
soldier undergoes definite changes in attitude toward
1. Stouffer et al, op. cit., II, 242-289.
his situation. Although such attitudes vary depending 
on individual personality and combat experience, they 
typically follow this course. Upon arrival to his unit 
and for several weeks following, the soldier is excited 
to be in the war zone and looks forward to engaging 
the enemy. After the first serious encounter, however, 
he loses his enthusiasm for combat. The soldier be­
comes highly respectful of the enemy’s fighting abilities 
and begins to develop anti-South Vietnamese senti­
ments. He is dubious of victory statements issued 
from higher headquarters and official reports of enemy 
casualties. From about the third to the eight month 
of his tour in Vietnam, the soldier operates on a kind 
of plateau of moderate commitment to the combat role.
Toward the ninth and tenth months, the soldier’s 
esprit picks up as he begins to regard himself as an 
«old soldier». It is usually at this point that the soldier 
is generally most combat-effective. As he approaches 
the end of his tour in Vietnam, however, he begins no­
ticeably to withdraw his efficiency. He now becomes 
reluctant to engage in offensive combat operations. 
Stories are repeated of the men killed the day they 
were to rotate back to the United States. «Short- 
timer’s fever» is implicitly recognized by the others 
and demands on short-timers are informally reduced. 
The final disengagement period of the combat soldier 
is considered a kind of earned prerogative which those 
earlier in the rotation cycle hope eventually to enjoy. 
In other words, short-timer’s fever is a tacitly ap­
proved way of cutting short the soldier’s exposure to 
combat dangers.2
Overall, the rotation system reinforces a perspec­
tive that is essentially private and self-concerned. 
Thus, somewhat remarkably, I found little difference 
in the attitudes of combat soldiers in Vietnam over a 
two-year interval. This attitudinal consistency was due 
largely to each soldier’s going through a similar rota­
tion experience. The end of the war is marked by the 
individual’s rotation date and not by its eventual out­
come—whether victory, defeat, or stalemate. Even 
discussion of broader military strategy and the pro­
gress of the war—except when directly impinging on 
one’s unit—appears irrelevant to the combat soldier: 
«My war is over when I go home».
When the soldier feels concern over the fate of 
others, it is for those he personally knows in his own 
outfit. His concern does not extend to those unknown 
persons who have preceded him or will eventually re­
place him. Rather, the attitude is typically, «I’ve done 
my time, let the others do their’s.» Or, as put in the
2. In August, 1969, wide press coverage was given to the 
«Alpha Company incident» in Vietnam. This centered around 
the refusal of some men in the combat unit to return to battle. 
Although the incident was greatly overblown, it is significant 
that Alpha was known at the time to be a «short-timer’s» 
company.
13
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soldier’s vernacular, he is waiting to make the final 
entry on his «FIGMO» chart—«fuck it, got my orders 
[to return to the United States]». Whatever incipient 
identification there might be with abstract comrades- 
in-arms is circumvented by the privatized view of the 
war fostered by the rotation system.
Primary groups and self-interest. As a sociological 
concept, the notion of primary groups has been one 
of the most fruitful in furthering our knowledge of the 
makeup of human society and the operation of large- 
scale organizations. Indeed, the components of all in­
stitutions consist to some extent of small groups whose 
members associate with each other over extended 
periods of time, and develop some sense of shared 
cohesion and intimacy. In its pure-type formulation, 
the primary group consists of personal relationships 
in which the group’s maintenance and ends are in­
trinsically valued for their own sake, rather than 
mechanisms which serve individual self-interests.
Descriptions of combat motivation in military or­
ganizations have heavily relied on the importance of 
social groupings governed by intimate face-to-face 
relations. I particularly have in mind the germinal stu­
dies of World War II found in The American Soldier 
by Stouffer and his associates, and the analysis of the 
Wehrmacht by Shils and Janowitz.1 These and sim­
ilar studies saw combat behavior as largely dependent 
upon the individual’s identification and solidarity with 
fellow squad and platoon members. Little’s partici­
pant observations in an infantry rifle company during 
the war in Korea, although within the general frame­
work of primary-group analyses, differ by describ­
ing the basic unit of social cohesion as two-man re­
lationships rather than following squad or platoon 
boundaries.2
My observations in Vietnam, however, indicate that 
the concept of primary groups has certain limitations 
in explaining combat behavior and motivation even 
beyond that suggested by Little. At least in Vietnam, 
the instrumental and self-serving aspects of primary 
relations in combat units must be more fully appre­
ciated. If the individual soldier is realistically to im­
prove his survival chances, he must necessarily devel­
op and take part in primary-group relations. Moreo­
ver, as Little has pointed out, such reciprocal behav­
ior is likely to be most intense at dyadic levels in the 
form of two-man «buddy» relationships. But even the
1. Ibid,.', and Shils and Janowitz, op. cit.
2. Roger W. Little, «Buddy Relations and Combat Per­
formance», in Morris Janowitz (ed.J, The New Military (New 
York: Russell Sage Foundation, 19641, 195-223. See also the 
chapter «Primary Groups and Military F.ffectiveness» in Mor­
ris Janowitz with Roger W. Little, Sociology and the Military 
Establishment (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1965), 
77-99.
buddy relationship, at its core, consists of a mutual­
ly pragmatic effort to minimize personal risk. In other 
words, under the extreme conditions of ground war­
fare, an individual’s survival is directly related to the 
support—moral, physical, and technical—he can ex­
pect from his fellow soldiers. He gets such support 
largely to the degree that he reciprocates to the 
others in his group in general, and to his buddy in 
particular.
Interpreting the solidarity of combat squads as out­
comes of individual self-interest within a particular 
situational context can be corroborated by two 
illustrations. The first instance deals with the behavior 
of the man on «point» in a patroling operation. The 
point man is usually placed well in front of the main 
body, thereby being in the most exposed position. Sol­
diers naturally dread this dangerous assignment, but 
a good point man is a safeguard for the entire patrol. 
What happens often as not is that men on point be­
have in a noticeably careless manner in order to avoid 
regular placement in that position. (At the same time, 
the point man must not be so incautious as to put 
himself completely at the mercy of an encountered 
enemy force.) In plain language, soldiers do not typi­
cally perform at their best when on point; personal 
safety overrides group interest.
The paramouncy of individual self-interest in com­
bat units is also indicated by looking at the pattern of 
letter-writing. Squad members who have returned to 
the United States seldom write to those remaining be­
hind. It most cases, nothing more is heard from a sol­
dier after he leaves the unit. Once a soldier’s personal 
situation undergoes a dramatic change—going home 
—he makes little or no effort to keep in contact with 
his old squad. Perhaps even more revealing, those 
still in the combat area seldom attempt to initiate mail 
contact with a former squad member. The rupture of 
communication is mutual despite protestations of 
lifelong friendship during the shared combat period. 
The soldier writes almost exclusively to those with 
whom he anticipates renewed personal contact upon 
leaving the service: his family and relatives, girl 
friends, and civilian male friends.
Do the contrasting interpretations of the network 
of social relations in combat units—-the primary 
groups of World War II, the two-man relationships 
of the Korean conflict, and the essentially individual­
istic soldier in Vietnam described here—result from 
conceptual differences on the part of the commentators, 
or do they reflect substantive differences in the social 
cohesion of the American soldiers being described?
If substantive differences do obtain, particularly 
between World War IT and the wars in Korea and 
Vietnam, much of this variation could be ac­
counted for by the disruptive effects on combat soli­
darity caused by the introduction of the rotation sys­
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tem in the latter two wars.1 It is also relevant to note, 
however, that even in World War II certain students 
of American soldiers found the primacy of an individ­
ualistic ethos. In a comparison of the American and 
German armies, Spindler came to the conclusion that 
a central quality of the American’s orientation toward 
the military was «self-interest to the point of domina­
tion of all other values».2 Likewise, Rose attributed 
similar consequences to the American tradition of 
«looking out for Number One».3
latent ideology
Even if we could decide whether combat primary 
groups are essentially entities sui generis or outcomes 
of pragmatic self-interest, there remain other diffi­
culties in understanding the part they play in main­
taining organizational effectiveness. For it has been 
amply demonstrated in many contexts that primary 
groups can serve to hinder as well as to serve at­
taining the formal goals of the larger organization. 
Thus, to describe effective combat motivation princi­
pally in terms of primary-group ties leaves unanswer­
ed the question of why various armies—independent 
of training and equipment—perform differently in 
times of war. Indeed, because of the very ubiquity of 
primary groups in military organizations, we must 
look for supplementary factors to explain variations 
in combat motivation.
I propose that primary groups maintain the soldier 
in his combat role only when he has an underlying 
commitment to the worth of the larger soc'al system 
for which he is fighting. This commitment need not be 
formally articulated, nor even perhaps consciously 
recognized. But he must at some level accept, if not 
the specific purposes of the war, then at least the 
broader rectitude of the social system of which he is a 
member. Although American combat soldiers do not 
espouse overtly ideological sentiments and are extre­
mely reluctant to voice patriotic rhetoric, this should 
not obscure the existence of more latent beliefs in the 
legitimacy, and even superiority, of the American way 
of life.
Although the heuristic utility of the concept of ide­
ology has been a source of special controversy in a qui­
te extensive literature, I want only to specify some of 
the more salient values held by American combat sol-
1. Uyeki, in his discussion of the post-Korea peacetime 
Army, makes a similar point. He noted primary groups were 
weakened by rapid personnel turnover in units and the indivi­
dual soldier knowing his own time of separation from the servi­
ce. See Eugene S. Uyeki, «Draftee Behavior in the Cold-War 
Army, Social Problems, 8 (Fall, 1960), 151-158.
2. Cited in Kurt Lang, «Military Organizations», in James 
G. March (ed.), Handbook of Organizations (Chicago: Rand 
McNally & Company, 1965), 868.
3. Loc. cit.
diers in Vietnam. At the risk of further compounding 
an already confusing lexicon, I have used the term 
latent ideology to describe the social and cultural sour­
ces of those beliefs manifest in the attitudes toward the 
war held by American soldiers. Latent ideology, in 
this context, refers to those widely shared sentiments 
of soldiers which, though not overtly political or even 
necessarily substantively political, nevertheless have 
concrete consequences for combat motivation.
This conception of combat motivation draws upon 
the recent emphasis in diverse social science writings 
on the nature of those underlying aspects of belief 
systems which may set the context for political behav­
ior. In particular, I have in mind those ideas couched 
in such terms as political culture,4 basic value orien­
tations,5 ideological dimensions,6 central value sys­
tem,7 and political ideology.8 These notions have 
been developed to bridge the gap between the level of 
microanalysis based on individual behavior and the 
level of macroanalysis based on variables common to 
political sociology. It is with this kind of understand­
ing that we can best examine the dynamics of attitude 
formation among American combat soldiers. As Ro­
bert Lane has convincingly argued in his study of the 
«American common man», students of political behav­
ior have too often asked questions which are im­
portant only to political scientists.9 When the individ­
ual responds in away that seems either ideologically 
confused or apathetic, he is considered to have no po­
litical ideology. Moreover, since an individual’s in­
volvement in the polity is usually peripheral, it is quite 
likely that his political attitudes will be organized quite 
differently from those of ideologues or political 
theorists. But by focusing on underlying value orien­
tations, we may find a set of attitudes having a definite 
coherence—especially within the context of that indi­
vidual’s life situation.
Anti-ideology. Quite consistently, the American com­
bat soldier displays a profound skepticism of politi­
cal and ideological appeals. Somewhat paradoxically, 
then, anti-ideology itself is a recurrent and integral
4. Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba (eds.), Political Culture 
and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1965)
5. Seymour M. Lipset, The First New Nation (New York: 
Basic Books, Inc., 1963), 1-11.
6. Philip E. Converse, «The Nature of Belief Systems in 
Mass Politics», in David E. Apter (ed.), Ideology and Discon­
tent (New York: Free Press, 1964), 206-261.
7. Edward A. Shils, «The Macrosociological Problem: Con­
sensus and Dissensus in the Larger Society», in Donald P. Ray 
(ed.), Trends in Social Science (New York: Philosophical 
Library, 1961), 60-83.
8. Robert E. Lane, Political Ideology (New York: Free 
Press, 1962).
9. Ibid., 439-459.
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part of the soldier’s belief system.1 They dismiss pa­
triotic slogans or exhortations to defend democracy 
with «What a crock», «Be serious, man», or «Who’s 
kidding who?». In particular, they have little belief 
that they are protecting an outpost of democracy in 
South Vietnam. United States Command Information 
pronouncements stressing defense of South Vietnam 
as an outpost of the «free world» are almost as du­
biously received as those of Radio Hanoi which accu­
se Americans of imperialist aggression. As one sol­
dier put it, «Maybe we’re supposed to be here and 
maybe not. But you don’t have time to think about 
things like that. You worry about getting zapped and 
dry socks tomorrow. The other stuff is a joke».
in this same vein, when the soldier responds to the 
question as to why he is in Vietnam, his answers are 
couched in a quite individualistic frame of reference. 
He sees little relationship between his presence in Viet­
nam and the national polities which brought him there. 
Twenty-seven of the 34 interviewed combat soldiers 
defined their presence in the war in terms of personal 
misfortune (see Table 6.2.). Typical responses were: 
«My outfit was sent over here and me with it»; «My 
tough luck in getting drafted»; «I happen to be at the 
wrong place at the wrong time»; «I was fool enough to 
join this man’s Army»; and «My own stupidity for 
listening to the recruiting sergeant». Only five sol­
diers initially mentioned broader policy implications 
—to stop Communist aggression. Two soldiers stated 
they requested assignment in Vietnam because they 
wanted to be «where the action is».
Because of the combat soldier’s overwhelming pro­
pensity to see the war in private and personal terms, 
I had to ask specifically what the United States was 
doing in Vietnam. When the question was rephrased 
in this manner, the soldiers most often said they were 
in Vietnam «to stop Communism». «To stop Com­
munism» is about the only ideological slogan the A- 
merican combat soldier can be brought to utter. 
Nineteen of the 34 interviewed soldiers saw stopping 
Communism as the purpose of the war. But when they 
expressed this view it was almost always in terms of 
defending the United States, not the «free world» in 
general or South Vietnam in particular. They said: 
«The only way we’ll keep them out of the States is to 
kill them here»; ((Let’s get it over now, before they’re 
too strong to stop»; «They have to be stopped some­
where»; «Better to zap this country than let them do 
the same to us».
1. As Biderman insightfully states in his study of American
prisoners of war in Korea: «The most common attitude was not 
only relatively apolitical, it was antipolitical. The almost uni­
versalway of referring to Communist indoctrination and indoc­
trination matter was «all that political crap». It was «crap» not 
only because it was Communist, but because it was political». 
(Italics in the original.) Biderman, op. cit., 258.
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Fifteen of the soldiers gave responses other than 
stopping Communism. Three gave frankly cynical ex­
planations of the war by stating that domestic prosper­
ity in the.United States depended on a war economy. 
Two soldiers held that the American intervention was 
a serious mistake initially, but that it was now too late 
to withdraw because of the national commitment. One 
man even gave a Malthusian interpretation, argu'ng 
that war was needed to limit population growth. Nine 
of the soldiers could give no reason for the war even 
after extensive discussion. Within this group, one 
heard responses such as: «I only wish I knew»; 
«Maybe Johnson knows, but I don’t»; and «I’ve been 
wondering about that ever since I got here».
I asked each of the 19 soldiers who mentioned stop­
ping Communism as the purpose of the war what was 
so bad about Communism that it must be stopped at 
the risk of his own life. The first reaction to such a 
question was usually perplexity or rueful shrugging. 
After thinking about it, and with some prodding, 12 
of the men expressed their distaste for Communism 
by stressing its authoritarian aspects in social rela­
tions. They saw Communism as a system of excessive 
social regimentation that allows the individual no au­
tonomy in the pursuit of his own happiness. Typical 
descriptions of Communism were: «That’s when you 
can’t do what you want to do»; «Somebody’s always 
telling you what to do»; or «You’re told where you 
work, what you eat, and when you shit». As one man 
wryly put it, «Communism is something like the Ar­
my».
While the most frequently mentioned features of 
Communism concerned the individual’s relationship 
to higher authority, other descriptions were also given. 
Three soldiers mentioned the atheistic and antichurch 
aspects of Communism; two specifically talked of the 
absen.ce of political parties and democratic politicai 
institutions; and one man said Communism was good 
in theory, but could never work in practice because 
human beings were «too selfish». Only one soldier 
mentioned the issue of public versus private property 
ownership.
It should be repeated and heavily stressed that the 
reasons given for the war and the descriptions of 
Communism offered by the combat soldiers were 
nearly always the result of extended discussion and 
questioning. When left to themselves, the soldiers 
rarely discussed the reasons for America’s military 
intervention in Vietnam, the nature of Communist 
systems, or other political issues.2
2. Two revealing press reports further corroborate the non­
salience of ideology for American troops in Vietnam. An ex­
ecutive of the Star Publishing Company (an American-owned 
Okinawa-based concern handling commercial book and mag­
azine distribution for U.S. forces in Vietnam) stated: «A genre 
not popular are ideological books on the war itself». —·*
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Americanism. The fact that the American soldier is 
not overtly ideological should not obscure the exist­
ence of those salient values which do contribute to his 
motivation in combat. Despite the soldier’s ideologi­
cal unconcern and his pronounced embarrassment in 
the face of patriotic rhetoric, he nevertheless displays 
an elemental American nationalism in the beiief that 
the United States is the best country in the world. 
Even though he hates being in the war, the combat sol­
dier typically believes—in a kind of joyless patriotism 
—he is fighting for his American homeland. As al­
ready reported, when the soldier does articulate the 
purposes of the war, the view is most often expressed 
that if Communist aggression is not stopped in South­
east Asia, it will be only a matter of time before the 
United States itself is in jeopardy. The suasion of the 
so-called «domino theory» is powerful among combat 
soldiers as well as the general public back home.
The soldier definitely does not see himself fighting 
for South Vietnam per se. Quite the contrary, he 
thinks South Vietnam a worthless country. Indeed, the 
soldier’s high evaluation of his American homeland 
has its obverse side in a wide-spread dislike of the 
Vietnamese. The low regard in which the Vietnamese 
•—-«slopes» or «dinks»—are held is constantly present 
in the derogatory comments on the avarice of those 
who pander the GIS, the treachery of the Vietnamese 
people, and the numbers of Vietnamese young men in 
the cities who are not in the armed forces. Anti-Viet­
namese sentiment is most glaringly apparent in the 
hostility toward the ARVN (from «Army of the Repub­
lic of Vietnam», pronounced «Arvin») who are sup­
posed military allies. Disparaging remarks about the 
fighting qualities of the South Vietnamese forces are 
endemic.
—»-(Italics in the original.) Bestsellers among servicemen were, 
in descending order: westerns, mysteries, sexy novels, science 
fiction, war novels, and comic books. See Richard R. Lingeman, 
«Back At the Front», New York Times BookReview, February 
25, 1968, 2-3. Similarly, Bob Hope and his writers confessed to 
surprise that servicemen in Vietnam did not enjoy jokes based 
on «political material». Rather, comedy routines centering on 
stock Army situations were the best received. Reported in the 
New York Post, December 20, 1967, 6.
In another context, the nonpolitical sentiments of GIS were 
shown in the testimony of former Major General Edwin A. Walk­
er before a Senate subcommittee in 1962. Walker had, among 
other things, placed an announcement in the newspaper of the 
24th Infantry Division requesting those under his command to 
call a telephone number to re;eive guidelines, based on the in­
dex of the rightist Americans for Constitutional Action, on how 
to vote. Questioned as to how many troops followed his advice, 
the General responded: «I did not answer the telephone, sir. A 
sergeant did. And we had, for your interest, which is sad, and 
I hate to admit, only five calls from 13,000 men». See United 
States Senat e, Military Cold War Education and Speech Review 
Policies, Hearings before the Special Preparedness Subcom­
mittee of the Committee on Armed Services, 87th Cong., 2nd 
Sess. (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1962), 
1433.
In marked contrast to the ridicule and antipathy to­
ward the ARVN is the respect American combat sol­
diers show for enemy forces, either Viet Cong or 
North Vietnamese regulars. In particular, the Viet 
Cong’s ability to improvise tactically and make do 
with rudimentary weaponry is ruefully admired. There 
are frequent remarks along the line of: «If ARVN had 
only a couple of guys like the VC, we could go home 
today»; «Why do our Vietnamese fight so lousy and 
theirs fight so good». Yet, the American soldier is 
somewhat puzzled as to the reasons behind his oppo­
nent’s excellent fighting abilities and valor in combat. 
One occasionally hears serious explanations attrib­
uting the bravery of the enemy to their using mari­
juana or narcotics.
Materialism. A variety of factors underlie the soldier’s 
fundamental pro-Americanism, not the least of them 
is his immediate reliance on fellow Americans for mu­
tual support in a country where virtually all indige­
nous people are seen as actual or potential threats to 
his physical safety. He also has deep concern for his 
family and loved ones back home. These considera­
tions, however, are general to any army fighting in a 
foreign land. It is on another level, then, that I tried 
to uncover those aspects of American society as a uni­
que whole that were most relevant to the combat sol­
dier.
To obtain such a general picture of the soldier’s 
conception of his homeland, I asked the following 
question: «Tell me in your own words, what makes 
America different from other countries?» The over­
riding feature in the soldier’s perception of the Ame­
rican way of life is the creature comforts that life can 
offer. Twenty-two of the soldiers described the United 
States by its high-paying jobs, automobiles, consumer 
goods, and leisure activities. No other description of 
America came close to being mentioned as often as the 
high—and apparently uniquely American—material 
standard of living. Thus, only four of the soldiers 
emphasized America’s democratic political institu­
tions; three mentioned religious and spiritual values; 
two spoke of the general characteristics of the Ame­
rican people; and one said America was where the in­
dividual advanced on his own worth; another talked 
of America’s natural and physical beauties; and one 
black soldier described America as racist. Put another 
way, it is the materialistic—and the word is not used 
pejoratively—aspects of life ;n America that are most 
salient to combat soldiers.1
1. This description of how Americans perceive their country 
based on interviews with a small number of combat soldiers is 
in direct opposition to that found in a large-scales survey 
measuring citizen beliefs in five countries. When asked what 
aspects of their country they were most proud of, American 
overwhelmingly mentioned governmental and political —►
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The soldier’s belief in the superiority of the Ameri­
can way of life is further reinforced by the contrast 
with the Vietnamese standard of living. The combat 
soldier cannot help making invidious comparisons 
between the life he led in the United States—even if he 
is working class—and what he sees in Vietnam. 
Although it is more pronounced in the Orient, it must 
be remembered that Americans abroad, whether mili­
tary or civilian, usually find themselves in locales 
that compare unfavorably with the material affluence 
of the United States. Indeed, in the hypothetical situa­
tion where American soldiers would be stationed in a 
country with a markedly higher material standard of 
living than that of the United States, it is very likely 
they would be severely shaken in their belief as to the 
merits of American society.
Moreover, the combat soldier, by the very fact of 
being a combat soldier, also leads an existence that is 
not only more dangerous than civilian life, but that is 
additionally more primitive and physically harsh. The 
soldier’s somewhat romanticized view of life back 
home is buttressed not only by his direct observation 
of the Vietnamese scene, but also by his own imme­
diate and personal lower standard of living. It has 
often been noted that front-line soldiers bitterly con­
trast their plight with the physical amenities enjoyed 
by their fellow countrymen, both rear-echelon soldiers 
as well as civilians back home.' While this is superfi­
cially true, the attitudes of American combat soldiers 
toward their compatriots are actually somewhat more 
ambivalent. For at the same time the soldier is be­
grudging the civilian his physical comforts, it is these 
very comforts for which he fights. Similarly, combat 
soldiers envy, rather than disapprove, those rear- 
echelon personnel who engage in sub rosa profiteering.
The materialistic ethic is reflected in another cha­
racteristic of American servicemen. Even among front 
-line combat soldiers, one cannot help but be impres­
sed by the plethora of individually owned mechanical 
equipment. Transistor radios are practically de ri-
—>- institutions. See Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The 
Civic Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 
102. Yet the finding of a materialistic primacy among combat 
soldiers given here parallels those given in ethnographic studies 
ofworking-and lower-middle classAmericans in civilian contexts. 
See, for example, Arthur J. Vidich and Joseph Bensman, Small 
Town in Mass Society (New York: Doubleday &Company, Inc., 
1960); Ely Chinoy, Au tomo hile Workers and the American 
Dream (Boston: Beacon Press, Inc., 1965); Herbert J. Gans, 
The Urban Villagers (New York: Free Press, 1965); and 
Herbert J. Gans, The Levitlotvners (New York: Pantheon 
Books, Inc., 1966).
1. Nevertheless, the monetary rewards of combat service 
are not to be dismissed lightly. In 1968 an airborne staff 
sergeant, for example, earned monthly about $ 210 more 
than his counterpart in rank (pay grade E - 6) stationed in 
the United States: $ 270 income tax benefit, $ 65 combat zone 
pay, $ 55 «jump» pay, and $ 20 overseas pay.
gueur. Cameras and other photographic accessories 
are widely evident and used. Even the traditional let­
ter-writing home is becoming displaced by tape re­
cordings. It seems more than coincidental that Ame­
rican soldiers commonly refer to the United States as 
«The Land of the Big PX».
Manly honor. Another factor that plays a part in 
combat motivation is found in the notions of mascu­
linity and physical toughness which pervade the sol­
dier’s outlook toward warfare. Being a combat soldier 
is a man’s job. Front-line soldiers often make in­
vidious comparisons with the virility of rear-echelon 
personnel. A soldier who has not experienced combat 
is called a «cherry» (i.e., virgin). Likewise, para­
troopers express disdain for «legs» (as non-airborne 
soldiers are called). This he-man attitude is also found 
in the countless joking references to the movie roles 
embodied in the persons of John Wayne and Lee Mar­
vin. That the military organization seeks to capitalize 
on these tendencies in American life is reflected in 
such perennial recruiting slogans as «The Marine 
Corps Builds Men» and «Join the Army and Feel Like 
a Man».
In this regard, the observations made on the ethic 
of masculinity among Wehr macht soldiers during 
World War II seem equally appropriate to American 
soldiers in Vietnam;
Among young males in middle and late adolescence, 
the challenges of love and vocation aggravate anx­
ieties about weakness. At this stage fears about po­
tency are considerable. When men who have passed 
through this stage are placed in the entirely male 
society of a military unit, freed from the control of 
adult civilian society and missing its gratifications, 
they tend to regress to the adolescent condition. The 
show of «toughness» and hardness which is regard­
ed as a virtue among soldiers is a response to these 
reactivated adolescent anxieties about weakness».2
It should be underscored, however, that an exag­
gerated masculine ethic is much less evident among 
soldiers after their units have been bloodied. As the 
realities of combat are faced, more prosaic definitions
2. Shils and Janowitz, op. cit., 293-294. For relevant discus­
sions on the question of masculine identity in the American 
armed forces, see Henry Elkin, «Aggressive and Erotic Tenden­
cies in Army Life», American Journal of Sociology, 51 (March, 
1946), 408-413; D.W. Heyder and H.S. Wambach, «Sexuality 
and Affect in Frogmen», Arch. General Psychiatry, 11 (Sep­
tember, 1964), 286-289; and Peter G. Bourne, «Observations on 
Group Behavior in a Special Forces « A» Team Under Threat of 
Attack» (paper delivered at the Annual Meetings of the Ameri­
can Psychiatric Association, 1967). Furthermore, Bourne's 
observations of a Special Forces unit in Vietnam strongly cor­
roborate my own findings on the essentially individualistic 
frame of reference of combat soldiers.
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of manly honor emerge. (Also, there is more frequent 
expression of the male role in manifestly sexual rather 
than combative terms, e.g., the repeatedly heard «I’m 
a lover, not a fighter».) That is, notions of masculini­
ty serve to create initial motivation to enter combat, 
but recede once the life-and-death facts of warfare are 
confronted. Moreover, once the unit is tempered by 
combat, definitions of manly honor are not seen to 
encompass individual heroics. Quite the opposite, the 
very word «hero» is used to describe negatively any 
soldier who recklessly jeopardizes the unit’s welfare.1 
Men try to avoid going out on patrols with individuals 
who are overly anxious to make contact with the ene­
my. Much like the slacker at the other end of the spec­
trum, the «hero» is also seen as one who endangers 
the safety of others. As is the case with virtually all 
combat behavior, the ultimate standard rests on keep­
ing alive.
This account of American combat soldiers in Vietnam 
has addressed itself to some of the prevailing as­
sumptions on combat performance; particularly those 
social science viewpoints which deemphasized the 
salience of ideological considerations for combat sol­
diers and which stressed instead the determinative 
nature of primary relationships in combat groups. I have 
sought to demonstrate that these assumptions require 
mod'fication in certain major ways. Moreover, rather 
than conceiving the ideological and primary-group ex­
planations as mutually exclusive, our knowledge of 
combat motivation must be informed by an awareness 
of the manner in which both of these considerations 
are interrelated.
That the American soldier has a general aversion
1. On this same point with regard to American soldiers in 
the Korean conflict, see Little, op. cit., 202-204.
to overt ideological symbols and patriotic appeals 
should not obscure those latent ideological factors 
which serve as pre-conditions in supporting the sol­
dier to exert himself under dangerous conditions. For 
the individual behavior and small-group processes oc­
curring in combat squads operate within a wide­
spread attitudinal context of underlying value com­
mitments; most notably, an anti-political outlook 
coupled with a belief in the worthwhileness of Ameri­
can society. These values—whether misguided or not 
—must be taken into account in explaining the gener­
ally good combat performance American soldiers 
have given of themselves.
The findings reported in this study also reveal that 
the intensity of primary-group ties so often reported 
in combat units are best viewed as mandatory neces­
sities arising from immediate life-and-death exigencies. 
Much like the Hobbesian description of primitive life, 
the combat situation also reaches the state of being 
nasty, brutish and short. To carry the Hobbesian ana­
logy a step further; one can view primary-group pro­
cesses in the combat situation as a kind of rudimenta­
ry social contract; a contract which is entered into be­
cause of advantages to individual self-interest. Rather 
than viewing soldiers’ primary groups as some kind 
of semi-mystical bond of comradeship, they can be 
better understood as pragmatic and situational re­
sponses. Furthermore, the American soldier’s es­
sentially individualistic frame of reference is struc­
turally reinforced by the operation of formal organiza­
tional assignment policies—the rotation system— 
which sets a private terminal date for each soldier’s 
participation in the war. This is not to deny the exist­
ence of strong interpersonal ties within combat squads, 
but only to reinterpret them as derivative from the 
very private war each individual is fighting for his own 
survival.
r-
Here, then is a category of facts with very distinctive characteristics: it con­
sists of ways of acting, thinking, and feeling, external to the individual, and endowed 
with a power of coercion, by reason of which they control him. These ways of thinking 
could not be confused with biological phenomena, since they consist of representations 
and of actions; nor with psychological phenomena, which exist only in the individual 
consciousness and through it. They constitute, thus, a new variety of phenomena; and 
it is to them exclusively that the term «social» ought to be applied... These ways of think­
ing and acting therefore constitute the proper domain of sociology.
Emile Durkheim, «The Rules of Sociological Method».
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